Is the “New” Parmalat Model of Corporate Governance a Best Practice in Italy?

AbstractThis paper presents an analysis of corporate governance of the “new” Parmalat, born in the aftermath of the infamous financial scandal, and aims at verifying if this new model of governance can be considered a best practice for Italian listed companies. Many papers have already highlighted that the Parmalat scandal was facilitated by bad governance which did not have an efficient system for the safeguarding of creditors and minority shareholders in presence of a family corporation.This paper presents the results of the comparison between the “old” and “new” rules of Parmalat corporate governance, highlighting the considerable differences in the composition and functions of the various company bodies. Moreover, an in-depth analysis of the efficacy of the external and internal control systems is also provided. The main points of strength which make it possible to consider the new Parmalat as a model of best practice in Italy are identified, although critical aspects are also pointed out. The paper concludes by making suggestions aimed at strengthening the model of corporate governance of Italian listed companies